If we lack the kind of free will required for moral responsibility, what does that entail for the justification of particular punitive practices and punishment generally? Everyone seems to agree that incarceration can still be justified, and that retributive justifications of punishment will be unavailable. Beyond this, however, there is little agreement. In this article, I evaluate Derk Pereboom’s discussion of this issue in Living Without Free Will, and then articulate and defend my own positive position. In my view, significant (...) punishment can be justified on consequentialist grounds by the free will denier without betraying important concerns about justice. (shrink)

In this article, I propose and argue for a conception of inhuman treatment. In the human rights context, I claim, inhuman treatment is that which is grossly degrading. Relative to “cruel,” “inhumane,” and “degrading,” “inhuman” has received little attention from moral philosophers. My aim here is to analyze this concept in greater depth in order to determine what it brings to discussions about punishment and other kinds of treatment. I begin by drawing distinctions between “inhuman,” “inhumane,” and “degrading.” Then, I (...) discuss analyses of “inhuman treatment” proposed by Jeremy Waldron and John Vorhaus. Although I find both conceptions problematic, discussing each helps me to set the stage for my proposal. After articulating and arguing for my own conception, I conclude by briefly explaining some of its implications. (shrink)

In “Bloody Mary,” a statue of the Virgin Mary is depicted as bleeding, apparently “out its ass.” The author wonders whether Parker and Stone were doing something morally wrong by using blasphemy for comic effect. The author had an intuition that some moral boundary was crossed. But, though moral philosophy can sometimes begin with intuitions, it can't end with them. A philosophy that proclaims an action moral or immoral has to be grounded in good reasons and solid evidence along with (...) intuitions. The author examines this through the lens of utilitarianism. From a utilitarian perspective, it may be that blasphemous humor is morally acceptable on grounds that it makes a lot of people happy; or, it may be immoral on grounds that it causes a lot of shock, anger, and displeasure. An important part of morality involves being concerned with the consequences of actions and refraining from hurting others pointlessly. (shrink)